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at Zama after he had already been forced to leave Italy and no longer threatened Rome.
In the final analysis Rome's national level strategy was superior to that of Carthage.
What were the strategic factors that allowed Rome to absorb repeated body blows and to endure an enemy army in its homeland for more than a decade without succumbing? The answers to these questions provide the key to understanding Carthage's failure in the 2d Punic War.
A close examination of the 2d Punic War reveals many lessons at the strategic level of war that endure to this day. Hannibal and Carthage failed when their inherent strategic weakness was confronted by the more robust and resilient Rome. Roman strategy effectively combined all elements of national power into a coherent, war winning strategy.
A national strategy should be directed at the enemy's strategic center of gravity. In both opponents the strategic center of gravity was the political will of the respective governments, the Roman Senate and the Carthaginian oligarchy. Rome successfully attacked the Carthaginian center of gravity while the Carthaginians pursued a more peripheral strategy aimed at the allies of Rome. Carthaginian strategy focused almost solely on its military strategy, committed to war with Rome by a general unable to muster the strategic resources to win. Carthage never effectively employed its naval forces in concert with its land forces. Hannibal's successes point out the importance of training and experience in senior leaders. The strategic assumptions of a campaign plan must be valid for that plan to succeed. Hannibal's campaign was based on the invalid assumption that Rome's allies would defect following defeat of Roman armies in the field.
Finally successful campaigns consist of operations linked in space and time. Rome succeeded in linking their widely separated operations in Italy, Sicily, Greece, Iberia, and eventually North Africa. These lessons are explored later in this paper.
This paper looks at the 2d Punic War at the strategic level and attempts to answer question of why one of the "great captains" of military history failed so completely. This paper avoids the attraction of examining Hannibal's tactical and operational prowess except where those events provide an insight into strategic factors. A description of the rival strategies is followed by an analysis of why one succeeded and the other failed. The paper concludes with lessons a modern strategist can extract from the failures and successes of both Carthage and
Rome during the 2d Punic War. The reader of a modern source should always check to ascertain whether the writer relies more on Polybius or Livy. Polybius is clearly the more reliable source compared to Livy and meets a more strict criterion of honesty and truthfulness. Polybius was the son of a rich Greek landowner and rose to rank of general in the Achaean League. In 168 BC he was taken to Rome as a hostage. Polybius became very close to Roman nobility and was in fact adopted into the Cornelius Scipio family. He traveled extensively with his Roman hosts, walked the actual battlefields of the 2d Punic War only 40 years after they took place, and talked with surviving participants, including Numidian King Masinissa and Scipio Africanus' confidant Laelius. 3 Polybius accompanied Publius Scipio to Africa and witnessed the fall and destruction of Carthage that concluded the 3d Punic War. He later became a respected statesman in
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Greece and wrote extensively although many of his books have been lost. 4 Livy, on the other hand, wrote more than a hundred years after Polybius and was clearly a Roman writing for Romans; highlighting the greatness of Rome. At this point in the war this was the real aim of Mago, not to join his forces with Hannibal. 37 The
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Carthaginians thus maintained their mostly futile efforts aimed at Roman allies to the very end of the war.
ROMAN STRATEGY FOR 2D PUNIC WAR
Roman strategy evolved as events dictated changes to initial plans. The ends of Roman Scipio prepared the invasion force in Sicily from the surviving legionnaires from Roman disasters at Cannae and Herdonea. 43 Once in North Africa he successfully separated the Numidians from Carthage and obtained the formidable Numidian cavalry for his army. Hannibal was drawn back to North Africa and defeated at Zama. Defeat at Zama was compounded as
Hannibal had been lured into an area where there was no fort to fall back on and prevent the annihilation of his army. The result was the bloodless surrender of Carthage.
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FACTORS IN ROMAN VICTORY
There were eight major strategic limiting factors that together contributed to Carthage's defeat:
1. The war had to be a ground war. Carthage refused to employ its naval resources to confront Rome.
The main theater of war had to be fought in Italy. Fighting Rome elsewhere
would not threaten Roman political will.
3. Hannibal's invasion of Italy had to be over land due to lack of naval support. 4 . Hannibal had to find replacements for combat losses in Italy. Carthage did not possess the means or will to resupply or reinforce Hannibal.
Hannibal had to reduce Rome's manpower advantage through battle or
politics. Rome had to be willing to fight Hannibal on the battlefield and the manpower resources of the Roman allies had to be induced away from Rome.
6. Rome had to be prevented from striking directly at Iberia or Carthage.
Roman armies had to remain in Italy unable to strike at the center of Carthaginian wealth, Iberia, or the political center of the Carthaginian Empire, North Africa.
All of Rome's armies could not be defeated. The political will of Roman
Senate was Rome's center of gravity. Breaking that will could lead to a treaty advantageous to Carthage. The repeated defeat of Roman armies could lead to loss of political will in Senate. Carthage had been erstwhile competitors, especially for the Greek colonies of the western Mediterranean, and was oppressive in dealing with subject peoples. Roman rule provided better roads, civic infrastructure, secure trading routes, and a great deal of local autonomy. Carthaginian rule was based on cruelty and was very heavy handed. Carthaginian politics were based on wealth and avarice. Loyalty to Carthage never ran very deep. 46 This ran counter to the Carthaginian goal of luring Roman allies away. Rome was savage in punishing former allies who resisted Rome, such as Capua. Former allies, who returned voluntarily, even with a Roman army at its gate, were treated much more evenly.
LESSONS FOR TODAY'S STRATEGISTS
As stated earlier, there are numerous lessons for the modern strategist in the conduct of the 2d Punic War:
1.
All elements of national power should be welded into a cohesive national policy. Diplomatic skill can obtain what force cannot.
Informational power and economic power should be leveraged in concert with military power to achieve political goals. Military strategy should not lead political policy. 
3.
In order to succeed you must successfully attack the enemy's strategic center of gravity. At the strategic level this is often the political will of the enemy. Rome's political will never wavered through many defeats while Carthage's crumbled following tactical defeat at Zama.
4.
Strategic assumptions must be valid or a plan is doomed to failure.
Carthage assumed Rome's Italian and Latin allies would defect and therefore rob Rome of its significant manpower advantage. This assumption proved invalid and doomed the Carthaginian strategy.
5.
Theater strategy is executed through campaigns that consist of operations synchronized in time and space. Rome successfully linked their operations in Iberia, Sicily, Macedonia, and eventually North Africa into a war winning campaign.
6.
Military power is most effective when exercised in a synergistic joint manner; Carthage never leveraged naval power. A maritime power that cannot control the sea will cease to be a power.
7.
It is important to reinforce success at the strategic level; to build on the opportunities successes present. Rome consistently reinforced successes in outlying theaters, successfully diverting Carthaginian resources from Hannibal.
8.
Coalition warfare is difficult but also has the potential to provide significant advantages. Hannibal's matchless army was a coalition of a wide range of nationalities. Rome successfully blunted Macedonian efforts with cooperation with the Aetolian League.
9.
Strategic leaders require training and experience. Military brilliance, as evidenced by Hannibal, can compensate for shortages in strategic resources.
ALL ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER
The elements of national power: military, diplomatic, economic, and informational should be employed in a comprehensive national strategy aimed at the political goals of the nation. It is here that Roman policy was clearly superior to that of Carthage and Hannibal.
Diplomatic Power
Roman diplomacy resulted in obtaining grain from Egypt when Italy ceased to produce Masinissa to Rome to confirm his kingship over Syphax, cementing this alliance. 54 Roman envoys were also sent to Africa throughout the war to stir up trouble for Carthage.
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The negotiated Peace of Phoinike ended the war with Macedonia well before the end of the 2d Punic War, and it was advantageous to Philip in that it allowed him to retain some of his gains in the Balkans at Roman expense. However, the peace treaty represented a triumph of 
Economic Power
Carthage missed several opportunities to wield its significant economic power against Rome. In North Africa, Libya produced large amounts of grain for Carthage and for export to Greece for hard currency. 58 Rome was not so fortunate. Italian farms were not producing due to Hannibal's activities in southern Italy. There would have been a famine if not for grain bought from Egypt and grown in Sicily following the Roman victory there. Carthage never interdicted the flow of grain from Egypt either diplomatically or militarily.
In 215 BC the war was such a strain on Roman economy that soldiers went unpaid and a heavy property tax was levied to finance war. Even the sacred treasuries of Roman temples were utilized to finance the war effort. In a patriotic gesture, aristocrats refused to accept pay. The Romans were able to thwart the main thrust of the Carthaginians strategy aimed at separating allies from Rome by their tempered treatment of former allies who did not resist returning to the fold.
In 205 BC the twelve Latin allies who refused service in 209 BC were forced to provide double the yearly quota, all from the wealthy classes. These troops were then sent overseas on hardest service. 65 Since the 1st Punic War the Romans pursued a very smart policy with their Italian allies, colonizing, building roads, fortresses, and wise government policy that allowed the allies to share in profits and glory of Rome. 66 It was these walled cities that formed the pivots of Roman strategy. The Roman armies shadowing Hannibal's army always had secure bases to withdraw into. The walled cities of the loyal allies were connected by roads and could be readily resupplied. Hannibal's field army could not take them.
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Hannibal was a true master of informational warfare. Hannibal ordered that Fabius'
estates be left alone while others around it were devastated, undermining politically the most effective Roman strategist. 68 Hannibal was very careful in his attempts to woo allies. Allied prisoners were always returned home without ransom. When taking Tarentum by subterfuge
Hannibal carefully ensured Tarentine houses were spared while Roman houses were plundered.
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Military Power
The most important lesson a modern strategist can take from the failure of Carthage is the danger of allowing the military strategy to drive national policy. Political objectives should direct politico-military strategy, not the reverse. Carthage was committed to war with Rome by
Hannibal's attack on Saguntum. Carthage allowed Hannibal to set national policy with his attack on this Roman protected city. 70 Hannibal's disposition of Carthaginian forces obviously indicated he was, at least initially, entrusted with overall command of the Carthaginian military. 
STRATEGIC ENDURANCE
Strategic endurance is defined as political will combined with the strategic resources to sustain a nation's effort in a war. A nation must have the strategic endurance to win before and while a major war is prosecuted. Strategic endurance is a result of political will, social organization, and the ability to leverage strategic resources. 72 Rome's strategic endurance was clearly superior to Carthage's. Rome's political will remained constant in the face of the devastating defeats early in the war and throughout Hannibal's stay in Italy. Carthage's political will evaporated when confronted with a Cannae-like scenario following Zama.
Rome's political will was most at risk following the defeat at the battle of Cannae.
Roman consul Varro, the prime architect of disaster at Cannae, however was greeted warmly by Roman citizens following the battle and thanked for not losing heart in the Roman Republic. It was this flexibility, the sheer strength and vitality of Rome's political institutions that proved so formidable for Hannibal to overcome. 73 In another example following Cannae, ten captured
Romans and a Carthaginian envoy named Carthalo, went to Rome to ransom the numerous patrician prisoners from the battle. The Senate refused the ransom and ordered Carthalo and his prisoners to be clear of Roman territory by nightfall. 74 The Roman Senate went into continuous session after Cannae to demonstrate that leaders had not abandoned the city and were tending to public business. When Hannibal finally marched on Rome there was not a severe panic. The land upon which Hannibal was camped outside Rome was sold at public auction for full price.
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Carthaginian political will was embodied in the ruling oligarchy. While there was a Carthaginian Senate, the real power in Carthage was with the inner "Council of Thirty" and the board of judges known as "The Hundred." 76 These two bodies consisted of the wealthy, commercial families of Carthage. Two political factions operated in Carthage: the war party, also known as "the Barcids" (Hannibal's family name) and the peace party led by Hanno.
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Hanno was instrumental in denying Hannibal's requested reinforcement following Cannae.
Hannibal had started the war without the full backing of Carthaginian oligarchy. His attack of Saguntum presented the oligarchy with a choice of war with Rome or loss of prestige in Iberia.
The oligarchy and not Hannibal controlled the strategic resources of Carthage. Carthage could never match the political will and strategic resources of Rome. Carthage could only field 100 to 120 thousand soldiers and needed to defend both Iberia and North Africa. 79 In contrast, Rome could muster 700 thousand trained soldiers per year. All Roman male citizens between the ages of 17 and 46 were liable for military service. 
ATTACK THE ENEMY'S STRATEGIC CENTER OF GRAVITY
The Roman strategic center of gravity was the political will of the Roman Senate. Romans forced Pyrrhus to defend and garrison the towns he had already taken. These were very similar tactics to those that eventually defeated Hannibal. Roman sea power consistently prevented adequate reinforcements from reaching Hannibal.
Hannibal was only able to evacuate Italy during an "armistice" period with Scipio already in Africa. Roman success underlines the importance of a "Fleet in Being." Elsewhere, Rome's unceasing activity served to isolate Hannibal and forced him to fight alone. 95 Rome employed forces throughout the western Mediterranean where they experienced success against less talented Carthaginian commanders. Carthaginian armies were defeated and destroyed in Sardinia, Sicily, and most importantly, Iberia. Carthage had the strategic initiative early with a dominant position in the main theater only to lose it due to Roman successes in these other theaters. 
TRAINING OF STRATEGIC LEADERS
"Carry on offensive war like Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar, Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, Prince Eugene, and Frederick; read, re-read the history of their eightyeight campaigns; model yourself after them -that is the only means of becoming a great captain and acquiring the secret of the art of war; your genius, thus enlightened, will reject such principles as are opposed to those of these great men" -Napoleon Carthaginian prestige following the war to the point he was forced to flee by a nervous Rome.
He remained in the eastern Mediterranean where he eventually ended his own life steps ahead of apprehension by the Romans.
"The man himself eludes us, just as he eluded so many during his lifetime….Hannibal, the boy from North Africa who grows up to dominate European history for sixteen years, seems to vanish like the mist rising off Lake Trasimene on that fateful day; or like the south wind, the sun, and the dust that blinded the Romans at Cannae" -Ernle Bradford.
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